LEGISLATION: PENAL LAW / AUTOMOBILE INSTALMENT PURCHASES by unknown
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 2 
Issue 4 NEW YORK LAW FORUM, vol II, number 
4, October, 1956 
Article 6 
October 1956 
LEGISLATION: PENAL LAW / AUTOMOBILE INSTALMENT 
PURCHASES 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
LEGISLATION: PENAL LAW / AUTOMOBILE INSTALMENT PURCHASES, 2 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 412 (1956). 
This Legislation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
LEGISLATION
PENAL LAW-FIFTEEN-YEAR-OLD DEFENDANT GIVEN RIGHT TO PLEAD
GUILTY TO LESSER CRIMHE IN CAPITAL PROSECUTION-COURT MAY Now
CHARGE AS TO LESSER DEGREES AND CRIMES, AND JURY MAY FIND DEFEND-
ANT GUILTY OF LESSER INCLUDED CRmE.-The New York State Legisla-
ture has amended the Penal Law1 to permit a child fifteen years old, who
has been indicted for a crime the mandatory penalty for which is death
or life imprisonment, to plead guilty to a lesser degree of that crime or any
crime necessarily included in the crime charged. The amendment also per-
mits the court to include in its charge to the jury the lesser degrees of such
a crime as it may where adults are concerned.
2
Section 2186,3 prior to amendment, permitted a criminal court to
acquire jurisdiction of a child under the age of sixteen only where two
requisites were met: that the child was fifteen years of age at the time the
act occurred, and that an indictment was returned for a crime which
required as a penalty the death sentence or life imprisonment. The par-
ticular crimes requiring such disposition are murder in the first or second
degree, treason, and kidnaping.4 Where the child was indicted for such
crimes the court in its discretion could either try the child for the particu-
lar crime or turn him over to the children's court as a juvenile delinquent.
In the event the criminal court retained jurisdiction and proceeded to
trial, the jury was required to convict for one of the specified crimes, or
return a verdict of acquittal. 5 In case of an acquittal, the child could then
be sent to the children's court to be dealt with as a juvenile delinquent.
The result was that the child, if convicted of one of the above crimes, (the
only crimes which an infant of fifteen was capable of committing), at the
very least had to be sentenced to life imprisonment. On the other hand,
if the child was found to be a juvenile delinquent, the children's court, at
most, could retain its jurisdiction only until the child reached the age of
twenty-one.6 A practical problem arose where-the misconduct of a child
was of such a nature that the punishment available was either too severe
or too mild.
7
In People v. Murck,8 the defendant was indicted for first degree mur-
der, and at the time the act was committed was fifteen years, ten months,
and six days old. The Court of Appeals, in affirming a conviction of murder
1 N. Y. PEN. L. § 2186.
2 N. Y. L. 1956, c. 919, effective July 1, 1956; and N. Y. CODE CRIB. PROc.
§ 444.
3 See note 1, supra.
4 People v. Fields, 174 Misc. 309, 311, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 702, 704 (Kings Co. Ct.
1940).
5 See note 1, supra, and N. Y. Herald Tribune, April 23, 1956, p. 10, col. 6.
6 N. Y. Dom. REL. CT. AcT § 61.
7 Report by the Dist. Atty. of Kings County, N. Y., Edward S. Silver, for thc
year 1955, p. 55.
8 263 N. Y. 285, 189 N. E. 220 (1934).
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in the second degree, held that the trial judge's refusal to charge the lesser
degrees of the crime was correct, notwithstanding that if the defendant had
been sixteen years old, a charge containing the lesser degrees would have
been proper.9
The defendant in People v. Hopkins,'° age fifteen, was also indicted
for first degree murder. He had been involved in a teen-gang fight,
in the course of which he had picked up a rifle and, in attempting to
frighten his adversaries by firing over their heads, had killed one of them.
The court refused to try the defendant. In turning him over to the children's
court it stated that it would not take the chance of a jury's returning a
verdict which would require the death penalty or life imprisonment, when
the same act, if committed by an adult, would only be manslaughter."1
The usual situation in which this problem arose was in those multiple-
defendant indictments where the culpability of one or more defendants was
less than that of other defendants in the same indictment. The court was
powerless to apply its discretion by following any rule of comparative
responsibility.1
2
As enacted, the amendment provides that once the criminal court ac-
quires jurisdiction over a fifteen-year-old defendant, it may, in its discre-
tion, "accept a plea of guilty to any crime of a lesser degree or any crime
necessarily included in the crime charged or, upon the trial of the crime
charged, the court may submit to the jury any crime necessarily included
in the crime charged.' 3 Prior to the amendment a jury was placed in the
position to choose between a verdict requiring death or life imprisonment
(notwithstanding that a lesser penalty seemed more appropriate), and a
verdict of acquittal. Under the law as amended a jury may find a fifteen-
year-old defendant guilty of a lesser crime than that charged in the indict-
ment as it may where adults are concerned.
AUTOMOBILE INSTALMENT PURCHASES-RECENT NEw YoR.K AND NATIONAL
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS.-The New York Legislature has enacted, and
the Governor has signed into law, the Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales
Act,' effective October 1, 1956. This statute requires all non-commercial
9 Id. at 289, 189 N. E. 220, 221.
30 205 Misc. 666, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 851 (Queens Co. Ct. 1954).
"i Id. at 671, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 851, 854.
12 See note 7, supra.
13 See note 2, supra.
' N. Y. L. 1956, c. 633 §§ 1, 2, eff. Oct. 1, 1956; amending N. Y. PERs. PRop. L.
§ 64-a by adding a new paragraph to read: "The provisions of this section shall not
apply to the sale of motor vehicles as defined in article nine of this chapter."; amend-
ing N. Y. Lx L. § 239-i by adding at the end a new paragraph to read: "The pro-
visions of this section shall not apply to the sale of motor vehicles as defined in arti-
cle nine of the personal property law."; renumbering N. Y. PERs. PROP. L. art. IX
§§ 272-3 as art. X §§ 350-1; amending N. Y. PaRs. PROP. L. by adding thereto a new
art. X §§ 301-11.
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retail instalment contracts for the sale of motor vehicles, at a price of $3,000
or less to be in writing or printed in minimum size type, to contain all
agreements of both parties including itemization of finance terms, and to
include notice to the buyer of his rights to prepayment, redemption and
resale. In addition, the Act, which is applicable to conditional sale, chattel
mortgage, and bailment lease contracts, fixes maximum rates for credit
service, delinquency and collection charges, declares certain types of pro-
visions unenforceable, and establishes both criminal penalties and civil reme-
dies for wilful violation.
I. PREvious LEGISLATIvE REGULATION
The new Motor Vehicle Act is not the first statutory regulation of
consumer instalment credit in New York. In 1941 the legislature enacted
the general Retail Instalment Sales Act,2 (hereinafter called the general
act), and amended the Personal Property3 and Lien Laws4 to regulate more
strictly the recovery of deficiency judgments by conditional sellers and
chattel mortgagees, and govern the financing of additional purchases between
parties to a conditional sale or chattel mortgage not fully satisfied. Origi-
nally, these acts applied to the retail instalment sale of any consumer goods
amounting to $1,500.00 or less, but in 1956 this maximum amount was
raised to $3,000.00.,
By the terms of the 1956 Act, the general act is expressly made in-
applicable to motor vehicles.6 The general act, much narrower in scope,
does not formalize the bargaining rights of the buyer, codify or modify
relevant case law, impose criminal penalties, or put a ceiling on finance
charges, as does the Motor Vehicle Act. It does set up formal and sub-
stantive requirements in retail instalment contracts loosely parallel to those
of the Motor Vehicle Act. Both are directed against sharp practices by
retail sellers, especially that of "packing" 7 or "bushing"--raising the origi-
nally quoted selling prices of the car and its accessories (usually based on
already padded rates from an official-looking list-price booklet), through
the lumping of credit services, delinquency, collection and insurance charges.
The pre-existing provision of the personal property law8 applies where
the buyer defaults, the seller duly exercises his rights of repossession and
resale and then seeks a deficiency judgment. In such case the buyer has
the right to a deficiency judgment computed by the difference between the
unpaid balance and the reasonable value of the commodity, plus reasonable
expenses of retaking, keeping and storing. If the buyer has paid at least
80% of the balance due, and surrenders the goods to the seller (at his re-
2 N. Y. PERS. PROP. L. § 54-a; N. Y. LIEM L. § 239-i.
3 L. 1941, cc. 860, 2 (N. Y. Pzns. PROp. L. §§ 80-b, 81).
4 L. 1941, c. 856 (N. Y. LIEN L. §§ 239, 239-a-1).
5 L. 1956, c. 754.
6 L. 1956, c. 633 § 2, eff. Oct. 1, 1956.
7 1956 Auto Ratings, Consumer Reports, April, 1956, p. 198.
8 See note 3, supra.
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quest and without legal proceedings) in ordinary condition, the seller within
five days must either retain the goods and release the buyer from further
obligation or return the goods to the buyer at the seller's expense and be
limited to an action to recover the unpaid balance.9 This protects the buyer
against "rigged" auctions and exorbitant fees when in default of only a
small percentage of the balance.
The lien law provision'0 allows if it is so provided. in the subsequent
contract goods purchased under a previous retail instalment contract to be
security for the purchase price of goods sold under the subsequent contract.
It also provides that any subsequent single instalment be credited in the
same proportion as the respective purchase prices bear to each other."
II. ECONomic BACKGROUND OF CURRENT LEGISLATION
The general objectives of all statutes governing retail instalment sales
are twofold: the adjustment of bargaining power between the retail seller
and instalment buyer, and the protection of the instalment buyer against
sharp practices in the selling, financing and servicing of consumer com-
modities by retail sellers. 12 Besides Hawaii,' 3 New York and seven other
jurisdictions 14 have legislated general Retail Instalment Sales,Acts. By the
present Motor Vehicle Act, New York becomes the eighth state15 to pass
a Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales Act. Besides Maryland, New York
is apparently the only state to enact both a general and a Motor Vehicle
Act.
Recent developments in the American economy seem to indicate the
reasons for the legislative attention given this particular industry. There
had been a number of inflationary factors operating in the automobile field,
including a fifteen-fold increase in the total volume of automobile retail
instalment sales credit since 1946; a 20% increase in the number of new
cars purchased on credit in the last two years; a considerable lengthening
in the average period of time allowed for such credit; an increase in the
average amount loaned to individual car owners through lower down pay-
9 See note 3, supra.
10 See note 4, supra.
11 See note 4, supra.
12 See Note, 63 HARv. L. Rxv. 874 (1950).
13 HAwAII REV. L. §§ 9141-69 (1950).
14 CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. §§ 5863-8, 6698-6704 (1949); IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-
901-34 (Burns 1951 Replacement); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS, v. 3, art. 83 §§ 116-52
(1951); MAss. ANN. L. c. 255 §§ 11-13H (Cum. Supp. 1953); N. J. STAT. ANN. 17:16B-
1-12 (1950); N. Y. PEaS. PROP. L. §§ 64-a, 80-b-81 (1941); N. Y. LIEN L. §§ 239,
239-a-1 (1941); Omo CODE § 6346-15-25 (Baldwin Serv. 1949); UTAu CODE ANN.
§§ 2981-2 (Supp. 1949).
i5 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981-2 (Supp. 1949); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-6-11 (1953);
ME. REv. STAT. c. 56 § 264 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS, art. 83 § 119-A (1951);
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.415 (Cum. Supp. 1956); NEv. L. 1953,.c. 346 §§ 1-2, at 625;
N. Y. PERS. PROP. L. art. X §§ 301-11 (1956); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69 §§ 601-37 (Cum.
Supp. 1948); Wisc. STAT. § 218.01(6) (1951).
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ments and higher prices; 16 and record earnings and expansion plans by the
major auto manufacturers.' 7 Recognizing this, the President, in his Annual
Economic Report, asked Congress to consider giving the Administration
authority to control consumer credit.' 8 In April 1956, the Federal Reserve
Board in Washington acted to halt the resulting inflationary trend by rais-
ing its discount rates from 2 2 % to 2 4 % in most of its member banks.19
The need for such legislation felt in New York and other states derives
also from other factors and conditions besides those economic reasons set
forth above. General usury laws do not apply to credit service charges in
retail instalment contracts. The weight of authority,20 including New
York,21 deems such a transaction to be a "sale on and of credit" and not
interest on a loan. It should further be recalled that until 1956, the New
York general act applied only to consumer goods priced at $1,500.00 or
less. The lowest factory-delivered list price of any 1956 American Four-
door passenger sedan is $1,795.00.22 So, the retail instalment sales of prac-
tically all new cars were excluded. This has been ameliorated by the 1956
provision raising the maximum amount from $1,500.00 to $3,000.00.23
Another factor drawing the legislators' attention has been the wide-
spread disregard of reasonable ethical standards in the advertisement and
sales of new and used cars in many parts of the country, including New
York. In 1955, the Association of Better Business Bureaus received over
75,000 inquiries and complaints "reflecting public irritation, confusion,
disbelief and a growing rebellion against high-flying claims, gimmicks and
double-dealing tactics of auto dealers."2 4 In 1955, New York amended its
Penal Law barring untrue and misleading advertisements to include as
"commodities" automobiles.2 5
The tendency of some dealers to engage in these practices may be
explained in part, though not excused, by the extreme economic pressure on
auto retail dealers by manufacturers and distributors to sell cars or lose their
franchise dealer contracts. This was accentuated in 1955, when record pro-
duction figures overloaded the showrooms of retail dealers2 6 with a "second-
year model 2 7 one showing little change from the appearance and features
16 N. Y. Times, Annual Review of Nation's Business & Finance-1955, Jan. 3,
1956, p. 49, cols. 3-4; p. 52, col. 3.
17 WORLD ALmANAC AND Boox OF FAcTS FOR 1956 49 (New York 1956).
18 N. Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1956, p. 24, col. 6.
19 Id. Jan. 25, 1956, p. 1, col. 8; p. 18, cols. 3-8.
20 See Note, 23 Corm. L. Q. 619 (1938).
21 Moldovan v. Julius Hebenstreit, Inc., 266 App. Div. 998, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 736
(1st Dep't 1943); Archer Motor Co. v. Relin, 255 App. Div. 33, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 469
(4th Dep't 1938).
22 See note 7, supra, at 171.
23 L. 1956, c. 754.
24 National Automobile Dealers Assoc. & Assoc. of Better Business Bur., Inc,
Press Release, Jan. 26, 1956, p. 2.
25 L. 1955, c. 361, eff. July 1, 1955.
28 See note 7, supra.
27 Id. at 153.
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of the model for 1954. The retail seller had to emphasize money-saving
"deals" that often included financial deception. In January 1956, the
Senate anti-monopoly subcommittee of the Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Committee initiated an investigation into the dictatorial power auto
manufacturers wield over their dealers.21 Out of this investigation came a
law passed by the second session of the eighty-fourth Congress29 and re-
cently signed by the President.3" It supplements the anti-trust laws by en-
abling auto franchise dealers to sue in federal district courts to recover
two-fold damages whenever a manufacturer fails to act in good faith within
the terms of the franchise in terminating or failing to renew it. In 1956,
New York passed a similar statute31 barring auto manufacturers or dis-
tributors from revoking or terminating dealer franchise contracts, except
for cause.
III. ScoPE OF NEW LEGISLATION
How and to what extent does this new statute protect the instalment
buyer of motor vehicles beyond existing statutory and decisional law? As
noted above, its two general objecives are to adjust the bargaining power
between the seller and buyer, and to protect the instalment buyer against
sharp practices by retail sellers in selling, financing and servicing.
32
A. Adjustment of Bargaining Power.-The attempt to put the buyer
more nearly in an arm's-length bargaining position has been approached
from three aspects. One is the statutory declaration of certain legal rights
of the instalment buyer previously left to negotiation between the parties.
The second is the statutory codification and modification of the general
New York case law of security transactions relevant to the retail instal-
ment sales of motor vehicles for consumer purposes. Third is the imposi-
tion of criminal penalties and the expansion of civil remedies for the pro-
tection of the instalment buyer.
1. Declaration of Rights Heretofore Left to Bargaining.-The Motor
Vehicle Act defines certain legal rights of the instalment buyer heretofore
left open to negotiation between the parties. These include the buyer's
right to select his own insurance broker, if the retail seller chooses to
include the insurance premium in the contract; to have any unearned in-
surance premium refund received by the holder of the contract credited
towards the satisfaction of unpaid instalments unless used for similar in-
surance protecting the interests of the buyer and/or holder; the right, upon
written request, to a written statement of the dates and amounts of all pay-
ments and the total unpaid balance under the contract; and the right to
a written receipt for all cash payments. Upon full prepayment, the buyer
is entitled to receive a proportionate refund of the credit service charge (less
a $15.00 acquisition cost).
28 N. Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1956, p. 1, col. 5.
29 Id., July 26, 1956, p. 51, col. 3.
30 Id., Aug. 9, 1956, p. 21, cols. 5-6.
31 L. 1956, c. 901 § 197.
32 See note 12, supra.
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2. Codification and Modification of New York Decisional Law.-The
statute in its second aspect both codifies and modifies relevant New York
case law.
First, any payment by the instalment buyer, without notice of an
actual or intended assignment, to the last known holders of the contract, is
binding upon subsequent assignees. This is a recognized exception to the
general rule that as between successive assignees the first in time prevails.3 3
Also, an arbitrary "insecurity" clause is unenforceable under the statute.
Such a clause permits repossession or foreclosure by the creditor whenever
he deems himself "insecure" even in the absence of reasonable cause or the
debtor's default. This has been held to violate the Personal Property Law
34
and public policy when contained in a conditional sales contract,33 but valid
in a chattel mortgage, where the mortgagee acted in good faith based on
some reasonable grounds, and not capriciously or maliciously.30
Other clauses declared void and unenforceable by the statute but
declaratory of case law include; any general waiver of the provisions of the
Act;3 7 any provision authorizing a seller or holder of a retail instalment
contract to make collections or to repossess the motor vehicle, without resort
to legal process, or in breach of the peace, or in violation of the criminal
law; any waiver of a right of action for such acts;3 8 and any clause totally
relieving the retail seller from liability to the instalment buyer for any legal
remedies under the contract or any auxiliary instrument.3 9
Further provisions of the Act modify legal principles developed by
past New York case law when applied to transactions falling under the
statute. The Act bars the execution of negotiable notes that cut off as to
third parties any claims that the instalment buyer may have against the
retail seller,40 although the statute does enforce a waiver of claims agree-
ment (except for illegal acts) by the instalment buyer in favor of an as-
signee for value without notice who within ten days mails notice of the
assignment to the instalment buyer.41 The Act makes unenforceable any
33 Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 212 N. Y. Supp. 425
(1st Dep't 1925).
34 N. Y. PEPs. PRop. L. § 65 (1922).
35 Warren v. Lair, 190 App. Div. 139, 179 N. Y. Supp. 639 (1st Dep't 1921),
aff'd without opinion 232 N. Y. 626, 134 N. E. 599 (1922).
36 Carter v. Phillips, 127 Misc. 903, 217 N. Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. Lumis Co.
1926).
37 St. Andrews Parish v. Gallagher, 121 Misc. 167, 200 N. Y. Supp. 590 (App. T.,
2d Dep't 1933).
38 Sturman v. Polito, 161 Misc. 536, 291 N. Y. Supp. 413 (City Ct. Rochester
1936); Triple Cities Constr. Corp. v. Byers Mach. Co., 172 Misc. 519, 15 N. Y. S. 2d
89 (Sup. Ct. Broome Co. 1939), rev'd on other grounds 259 App. Div. 451; 19 N. Y. S.
2d 709 (3rd'Dep't 1940), leave to appeal den. 259 App. Div. 955, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 844
(3rd Dep't 1940); N. Y. Pmas. PRop. L. § 76 (1922).
39 Pres. & Directors of Manh. Co. v. Monogram Assoc. Inc., 276 App. Div. 766,
92 N. Y. S. 2d 579 (2d Dep't 1949).
40 See N. Y. NEG. INST. L. §§ 20, 91 (1897).
41 See note 39, supra.
(Vol. 2
LEGISLATION
provision for a confession of judgment, power of attorney, or assignment
of wages, although such clauses are generally enforceable in other transac-
tions if executed in conformity with certain strict statutory formalities.
42
There is a major modification of existing case law in the provision that
the priority of a written assignment of the contract is not impeached as
against creditors of, and purchasers from the assignor, despite a failure
to record the contract, give notice to the instalment buyer, or deprive the
retail seller of dominion over payments upon the contract or over the motor
vehicle itself, if repossessed by the assignee. (However, as noted above,
notice to the instalment buyer is necessary to enforce a waiver of claims
agreement in favor of the assignee or prevent the buyer from paying the
last known holder of the contract with immunity.) In New York, while
there are no statutory provisions for filing assignments of conditional sale
contracts, the Lien Law43 does require that the assignment of a chattel mort-
gage be recorded to be effective against the assignor's subsequent creditors
and purchasers in good faith for value. Thus, there is an apparent statutory
conflict when a chattel mortgage comes within the purview of the Motor
Vehicle Act. It is also noteworthy that this Act does not employ those
rigid criteria of control necessary for an assignee of accounts receivable to
protect his assignment from attack as an illusory assignment under the
doctrine of Benedict v. Ratner.44
3. Criminal Penalties and Civil Remedies.-The third approach uti-
lized in the Act to adjust the bargaining power more in favor of the instal-
ment buyer is the imposition of criminal penalties and the expansion of
civil remedies for the buyer's benefit. Unlike the general act,45 which pre-
scribes no criminal punishment, any wilful and intentional violation of the
Motor Vehicle Act is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $500.00.
It should be noted here that § 442-a of the Penal Law makes it a mis-
demeanor punishable by a fine of up to $200.00 and/or imprisonment up
to three months for anyone in the business of financing purchases on the
security of realty or personalty to require, as a condition precedent thereto,
the debtor to negotiate an insurance policy through a particular broker
initially chosen by the creditor.46 However, this does not bar the reserva-
tion of the right of approval by the creditor of such broker, so long as the
selection is by the borrower alone.
Civil sanctions include: a prohibition of the recovery of any credit
service, delinquency, collection or refinancing charge by any person who
wilfully violates those sections in the Act covering the required contents
of instalment contracts and limiting credit service charges, and the un-
conditional right of the buyer to cancel the contract and receive immediate
3 42 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 540-2 (1920), 543 (1942); N. Y. PERS. PROP. L., art.
3-A §§ 46-9 (1950).
43 N. Y. L sm L. § 232-a (1948).
44 268 U. S. 353, 45 S. Ct. 566 69 L. Ed. 991 (1925).
45 See note 2, supra.
40 L. 1940, c. 91, as amended L. 1947, c. 153.
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refund of all payments and re-delivery of all goods traded in, until the
seller delivers or mails to the buyer a signed copy of the contract, pro-
vided such buyer has not received delivery of the motor vehicle. However,
it should be noted that any failure to comply with any provision of the
Act is correctible, without any liability, within 10 days after the holder
of the contract is notified thereof, in writing, by the buyer. Whether such
written notice is a condition precedent even to criminal prosecution is an
open question.
B. Protection Against Sellers' Sharp Practices.-The second general
objective of this statute is to protect the instalment buyer against "sharp"
practices by retail sellers in selling, financing and servicing. To effectuate
this, the statute prescribes formal and substantive standards.
1. Formal Contract Requirements.-Formally, the contract must be
in writing or print, must contain all material terms and be signed by both
parties. To prevent any abuses flowing from the use of "fine print" mini-
mum type sizes for various parts of the contract, of which a court may take
judicial notice,47 are established. A signed copy of this contract must then
be delivered to the buyer, and upon the seller's failure to do so and until
acceptance of delivery of the motor vehicle, the buyer has the unconditional
right of cancellation and full restitution. Maryland has strictly enforced
a similar provision, with a 15-day time limit, under a similar statute, not-
withstanding the lack of any prejudice to the buyer.48 If insurance is in-
cluded, a completely itemized copy of the policy must be received by the
buyer within 30 days after execution of the contract.
2. Substantive Contract Requirement.-Besides these formal require-
ments, there must be certain substantive provisions in retail instalment
contracts, aimed at maximum disclosure and minimum financial oppression.
The contract must contain an express statement in ten-point bold type that
liability insurance coverage is absent, if that is the fact. This prevents the
creditor from attributing excessive finance charges to non-existent insur-
ance rates. There must also be an explicit "NOTICE TO THE BUYER"
in ten-point bold type of his legal right to prepayment (and the resulting
partial credit service charge refund), redemption, resale, and to receive
a completely filled-in copy of the contract. Included also must be a com-
plete and detailed itemization (in dollars and cents) of all specified terms
and conditions of finance as defined in the Act.
The statute puts a ceiling on credit service, delinquency, collection,
refinance charges and attorneys' fees. The maximum credit service charge
allowed depends on the age and condition of the motor vehicle, and is com-
puted as a percentage of the principal balance. It must be payable in rela-
tively equal amounts of successive monthly instalments provided in the con-
tract. This prevents a "balloon" contract (deceptively small instalments
and a giant final balance). For any new motor vehicle whose year model
47 Titone v. General Electric Credit Corp., 201 Misc. 1041, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 909
(Sp. T., Kings Co. 1951).
48 Stride v. Martin, 184 Md. 446, 41 A. 2d 489 (1945).
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is the same as the year of the sale, the maximum credit charge is 7%. For
vehicles whose year model is less than two years prior to the year of the
sale, it is 10%, for all other used motor vehicles, it is 13%.
The Act allows the inclusion of a delinquency and collection charge
in the contract for each instalment in default over ten days equal to 5% of
the instalment or $5.00, whichever is less. Refinancing charges may not
exceed $5.00 for a flat service fee plus 1% per month on the respective
descending unpaid balances. Where the contract is referred for collection
to an attorney, the payment of the attorney's fees up to 15% of the amount
due is allowed, if so provided in the contract.
New York State has enacted other legislation that directly or indi-
rectly seeks to protect the instalment buyer of motor vehicles. For exam-
ple, § 421 of the Penal Law, noted above,49 prohibits use of "Would you
take $ ...... in trade for your car" cards, "blitz" selling by bait-switch
advertising, and similar devices. Three other acts were recently signed into
law by the Governor following the 1956 legislative session. The new Arti-
cle 11-B of the Banking Law5" provides for the licensing and administrative
regulation of sales finance companies by the Superintendent of Banks. This
may minimize the giving of rebates or "kickbacks" 51 by finance companies
to retail sellers who immediately assign their contract at a discount, paid
for by the instalment buyer through higher credit service charges. A sec-
ond, which amends § 78 of the Personal Property Law and § 239-e of the
Lien Law, sets maximum charges for reasonable retaking, keeping and
storing expenses and requires that an itemized statement be given to the
buyer upon default. 52 A third, which adds a new Article 11-A to the Gen-
eral Business Law,53 requires every New York motor vehicle manufacturer
or factory branch operator to be licensed by the Secretary of State, and
bars them from revoking or terminating dealer franchise contracts, except
for cause. This deprives auto dealers of their main "excuse" for unethical
selling techniques, to wit, the fear of arbitrary cancellation of their fran-
chises upon failure to accept the quota of cars set by the manufacturer or
his distributor.
IV. FEDERAL PROTECTION OF THE INSTALMENT BUYER
An effort has also been made to protect the instalment buyer of motor
vehicles on an interstate basis by federal administrative regulation and
statutory enactment. From 1941 through 1949, Regulation W of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board" was in effect, which, besides limiting consumer in-
49 See note 25, supra.
50 L. 1956, c. 635.
51 Longgood, Watch out for those GyP Car Deals, The Saturday Evening Post, Oct.
29, 1955, p. 27.
52 L. 1956, c. 634.
53 See note 37, supra.
54 12 C. F. R. pt. 22 (Cum. Supp. 1943); issued orig. as a defense measure on
Sept. 1, 1941, Exec. Order #8843, 3 C. F. R. c. 2 (Cum. Supp. 1943); removed by
Congress on Nov. 1, 1947, 61 STAT. 921 (1947); restored on Sept. 20, 1948 and allowed
to expire on June 30, 1949, 62 STAT. 1291 (1948).
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stalment credit by requiring larger down payments and shorter credit peri-
ods, also tried to improve practices55 in instalment selling by requiring the
retail seller to deliver to the instalment buyer a written contract stating
the cash sale price, insurance and carrying charges. Similar control was
exercised by the Economic Stabilization Administration during the Korean
War under the Defense Production Act of 1950.6 On January 31, 1951, the
Federal Trade Commission promulgated Trade Practice Rules relating to
the retail instalment sale and financing of motor vehicles. 7 Applicable only
to interstate commerce, the rules call for separate disclosure of "the finance
charge, insurance costs and other charges . . . paid by the purchaser." Fail-
ure to comply is an unfair trade practice, and may lead to a cease-and-
desist order. As noted above, the second session of the eighty-fourth Con-
gress has passed58 and the President signed59 an amendment to the Anti-
trust Laws enabling auto franchise dealers to sue a manufacturer in the
federal courts, for twofold damages, for failure to act in good faith in
terminating or failing to renew a franchise contract.
On a voluntary basis, the National Automobile Dealer's Association,
in conjunction with the Association of Better Business Bureaus, Inc., estab-
lished early in 1956, recommended standards for advertising and selling
automobiles.
V. CONCLUSION
The legislative attack on this economic and ethical problem, as illustrat-
ed by the recent New York Acts discussed above, is bound to provide some
of the needed protection for the instalment buyer. Finance companies and
retail dealers in New York must now conform the substance and form of
retail instalment contracts to the letter of the new law. Instalment buyers
can now better withstand attempted financial imposition, through the statu-
tory limitation of service charges and the mandatory disclosure of their
rights and responsibilities. Many sharp practices are blunted by the
new statutes. A welcome, if limited, step toward New York statutory
uniformity has been made by the integration of identical standards for
conditional sales contracts, chattel mortgages and bailment leases into this
one statute.
However, this statute, as any other, has its limitations. For one thing,
it does not, and, no doubt, could not cover every unethical device utilized
by retail dealers. Such lures as misleading "guaranties" or "warranties,"
"free driving trials," and such practices as the disguising of used taxicabs
are not considered. For another, the enforcement teeth are not very sharp.
Violators are given 10 days' written notice and an opportunity for correc-
tion before any criminal or civil liability is imposed. This would almost
55 Reg. W § 222(4)(d).
56 Title IV § 401, 64 STAT. 803 (1950), 50 U. S. C. § 2101 (1952); terminated on
April 30, 1953, 50 U. S. C. § 2166.
57 8-16 C. F. R. § 197 (1-5), eff. June 7, 1851 (Supp. 1954).
58 See note 35, supra.
59 See note 36, supra.
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seem to leave the basic definition of ethical standards to market competi-
tion and voluntary self-regulation.
Possibly most serious as a limitation is that it is state legislation and
can hardly be expected to conquer a national problem. Only 15 states and
Hawaii have comparable legislation on this subject, but this is by no means
uniform in scope or substance.
However, the constitutional obstacles to truly effective federal legisla-
tion in this field are such that there is little probability of congressional
action in the foreseeable future. Under the circumstances, New York's at-
tempt to protect its consumer citizens by filling in some of the deeper pit-
falls in the automobile market place finds it aligned with that minority of
states which have recognized the problem and worked for at least a local
solution.
